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Introduction
After almost a century of struggle against colonial rule and over a decade 
of bitter armed struggle when the two African liberation movements, the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) took up arms to liberate the country from White 
domination, Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. The independence 
era was ushered in amidst a great deal of rejoicing by an African population 
that was brimful with optimism that the country was on the threshold of a 
new future that would be both prosperous and peaceful. They had every 
confidence that, now that a people’s government was in power, the 
inequalities of the colonial past would be redressed. Full access to education 
and health services, among other services which had been denied the 
African majority under colonialism, would be assured for all. As the British 
flag was lowered for the last time and the new Prime Minister, Robert 
Mugabe, addressed those gathered at Rufaro Stadium in Mbare to celebrate 
the coming of independence, the Zimbabwean air was pregnant with 
promise.
The optimism of the people was not entirely unjustified as ZANU, in its 
earlier policy statements and in its 1980 pre-election manifesto, had 
promised to build a socialist nation based on equity and undertook to 
pursue developmental policies for the benefit of the Black majority. Indeed, 
the new government proceeded swiftly to end racial discrimination and 
enacted legislation designed to improve the quality of life for the 
Zimbabwean majority.
Among the many measures adopted by the Mugabe government were 
the expansion of education facilitiesjo service those areas that had hitherto 
been ignored by the. colonial administrations and the provision of free- 
primary education and free health services to benefit the poor majority. 
Basic consumer goods such as mealie meal (the staple food), milk, cooking 
oil and several other items were subsidised to make them affordable to the 
Zimbabwean poor. A minimum wage law was promulgated to ensure that 
workers received a decenfliving wage. As will be shown below, the quality 
of life of the Zimbabwean majority improved considerably during the first 
decade of independence despite numerous economic, geo-political,' 
environmental and other problems that faced the country between 1980 
and 1990.
J3y 1995, however, the optimism was fading away fast as the impressive 
gains made in the educational, health and other fields were being steadily 
eroded, mainly as a result of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World 
Bank (WB) Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)1 which
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Zimbabwe began implementing in 1991. School enrolments were declining, 
people were avoiding the numerous health facilities that had been 
established in 1980, infant mortality was on the increase, the country’s 
primary health care system was crumbling from lack of staff and essential 
drugs, while inflation was eating into the incomes of the Zimbabwean people 
in general and the low-income groups in particular.
However, Zimbabwe suffered a series of droughts throughout the period 
under discussion. In fact the 1991-95 reform programme was, in the words 
of one source, ‘greeted by the most economically devastating drought ever 
experienced in the history of the country’ , which resulted in some sectors 
of the economy, such as agriculture, witnessing a serious decline in 
productivity. It is also noted that the programme was also ‘bade farewell 
[sic] by a second drought in 1994/95’.2 The strain on the national economy 
exerted by these droughts and the droughts’ contribution to the problems 
facing the Zimbabwean people cannot be under-estimated.
Nevertheless, because scores of studies on the impact of ESAP in other 
developing countries since the 1980s clearly demonstrate that the pattern 
of impoverishment and hardship which manifested itself in Zimbabwe 
between 1991 and 1995 is similar to that of other countries which did not 
experience droughts at the time of implementing ESAP, it is contended here 
that ESAP was the most decisive variable in the reversal of gains registered 
by the Zimbabwean people during the first decade of independence.!
In her study, Hevina Dashwood (1996) disputed the fact that IMF/World 
Bank reform programmes inherently cause hardships for the poor majority. 
She argued that
It is not so much the market-based reforms that have been detrimental 
to the long-term interests of the poor, but rather a failure to integrate 
these reforms with additional poverty related policies in order to create 
a coherent, socially sensitive development strategy.1
With regard to Zimbabwe, specifically, she contended that it was, in fact, 
the ruling elite that resisted the urging of the IMF and the World Bank to 
protect the poor and which, therefore, was to blame for the impoverishment 
of the majority under ESAP. In her words,
Such influential institutions as the World Bank have now recognised the 
need to support programmes that provide primary education and health 
care, as well as the need to provide safety nets to protect the very poor 
. . . the government of Zimbabwe [in fact] had even to be persuaded by 
the World Bank to include the Social Dimensions of Adjustment 
programme in its overall reform programme.’
In the light of the argument of this stqdy, that IMF/World Bank 
programmes, by their very nature, hurt the poor, Dashwood’s claim needs
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to be questioned. First, it has to be pointed out that the Zimbabwean 
experience underJ/lSAP is not unique. If the reform programme’s negative 
effects on the poor were limited only to Zimbabwe, it would be sensible to argue 
that it was indeed the Zimbabwean ruling elite’s own fault that the poor majority 
experienced hardships under ESAP. However, the fact that the negative 
effects of such reform programmes on the poor have been consistently 
observed in all the countries that implemented the programmes since the 
1980s and throughout the wide cross-section of countries in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia makes Dashwood’s analysis untenable.6
Secondly, Dashwood’s claim that the World Bank is sensitive to the need 
to provide safety nets for the poor and to promote education and health, 
while true for the present time, is not sustainable for the early years of 
IMF/World Bank SAPs as the numerous studies on the impact of World Bank 
and IMF reforms on the poor have long documented. At 1991, when 
Zimbabwe embarked on its reform programme, the World Bank was just 
beginning to respond to the increasing barrage of protests against the 
deleterious impact of its policies on the poor.
To question Dashwood’s interpretation of the role and impact of IMF/WB 
reform programmes is not, however, to deny that the Zimbabwean ruling 
elite could have handled the situation differently and put into place, from 
the very start, measures to protect the interests of the poor and to minimise 
the damage to the country’s social services which benefit the poor. 
However, as her own study demonstrates, by 1991, the mood and thinking 
of the ruling elite had undergone a metamorphosis as manifested by its 
renunciation of the socialist ideology. The elite was, by then, speaking a 
language which would have been unrecognisable to anyone who had 
listened to its pronouncements only a few years earlier. The elite’s earlier 
rhetoric championing socialist egalitarianism had, by then, been replaced 
by a capitalist ethos that now emphasised growth rather than development 
and talked about cost-recovery rather than equity.
The point being made here is that, while the role of the ruling elites in 
mitigating the negative effects of such reform programmes is important, it 
is crucial to appreciate the fact that the elites operate within the constraints 
of the IMF/WB conditions and implement a reform package which is 
informed by policies which, by their very nature, are unfriendly to the poor. 
The problem, therefore, is less to do with the lack of willingness of the 
ruling elite to defend the interests of the poor — although this is an 
important factor —  but with the very structure and objectives of the reform 
package itself.
In any case, as will be shown in this book, the safety nets that Dashwood 
refers to have proved to be token gestures which are grossly inadequate 
and have failed to address the immense problems confronting the poor
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whose condition has been worsened by the reforms. In the light of this 
evidence, therefore, it remains the contention of this study that 1MF/WB 
economic reform programmes are decidedly injurious to the poor. The 
ordinary Zimbabwean people were very quick to notice the deleterious 
impact of the reform programme on their lives as evidenced by the fact 
that, as they were increasingly buffeted by a myriad of mounting economic 
problems resulting from the structural adjustment programme, they began 
to refer to the term ESAP sarcastically as the Eternal Suffering of the African 
People.7
To emphasise the deleterious impact of the programmes on the poor is 
not to say that the reform programme impacted negatively on all sectors 
of the population or that all its results were wholly negative. Clearly, some 
sections of the economy and society did benefit from the programme. It is, 
in fact, the very  nature of such programmes to promote uneven 
development. Indeed, one of the most often repeated charges against SAPs 
is that they benefit the big companies and the wealthy members of society 
at the expense of the poor.* It can, in fact, also be confidently asserted that 
even the ordinary Zimbabwean people did realise improvements in some 
aspects of their lives, such as better urban transportation following the 
government’s de-regulation of the sector in 1994.!) Nevertheless, it is 
contented here that the overall impact of the programmes on the poor is 
negative, while their efficacy in improving the economy is yet to be proven.
Zimbabwe’s gravitation into the arms of the IMF and WB began soon 
after independence when it became a member of the two multi-lateral 
financial agencies. As a result of financial problems resulting from the 
economic downturn of 1982, Zimbabwe secured an eighteen-month standby 
credit from the IMF in 1983 worth Z$375 million. In return, it agreed to 
devaluation, restoration of internal and external balances and cuts in 
development programmes and subsidies.
In early 1984, the standby credit facility was suspended by the IMF 
because of Zimbabwe’s failure to meet both credit and budget reduction 
targets. Thereafter, Zimbabwe steered clear of the IMF. In the mid-1980s, 
however, Zimbabwe became involved with the WB when the Bank provided 
US$70 million to finance the country’s first export revolving fund. When 
Zimbabwe sought to extend this facility, however, the WB made the 
introduction of trade liberalisation a condition for the extension applied 
for. Although Zimbabwe refused to knuckle under at this time, persistent 
economic problems led to a gradual shift in position by the Zimbabwean 
government.
Consequently, in 1988, the Government set up a committee comprising 
University experts, representatives of the Zimbabwe Confederation of 
Industries and an Australian consultant to analyse the implications of
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embarking on an economic structural adjustment programme. On the basis 
of the committee’s recommendations, the Government announced a new 
investment code in May 1989 which loosened the restrictions on foreign 
investment in the country. Essentially, the Code redefined foreign 
companies as those with 25% of their shares or more owned by non- 
Zimbabweans as opposed to the earlier figure of 15%. Also in 1989, 
Government agreed to sign two international investment protocols which 
it had resisted throughout the 1980s.
By 1991, Zimbabwe was ready to embrace structural adjustment. First 
came the announcement of a major easing of price controls in February 
1990. Then in July, government announced that it would ‘de-emphasise its 
expenditure on social services and emphasise investment in the material 
production sectors such as agriculture, mining and manufacturing’. Import 
control and foreign currency allocation systems would be scrapped aud 
replaced by a more liberal system to be known as Open General Import 
Licence (OGIL) and tariffs. The country’s budget deficit would be reduced 
through a cut in the size of the civil service, the phasing out of subsidies to 
parastatals and the introduction of cost-recovery measures for social 
services. Finally, in January 1991, came the major economic structural 
adjustment programme document entitled Framework for Economic Reform, 
1991-1995. By 1991, therefore, Zimbabwe was fully in the clutches of the 
IMF and WB.
A number of questions immediately arise: Why did the Zimbabwean 
government agree to implement an economic reform programme whose 
harmful effects on the poor were already known from past experiences 
elsewhere in the developing world and which was likely to negate everything 
the nationalist leaders had claimed to struggle for? Why was a government 
which had been at the forefront of the struggle to end colonial inequalities 
and which had publicly dedicated itself to combat neo-colonialist 
imperialism now presiding over a process which would eventually re-impose 
colonial-type inequalities and a new form of imperialism, albeit one in which 
international financial agencies were the new colonial masters?
These questions become even more pertinent in the light of the 
Zimbabwean President R. G. Mugabe’s categorical and uncompromising 
statement in 1984 in response to a question by a journalist whether he did 
not feel that foreign aid given to Zimbabwe was likely to compromise its 
principles and make ‘ it difficult for the government to chart out an 
independent political programme and policy’. Mugabe responded:
Our donors should not think that they can dictate their own policies to 
Zimbabwe. So on that score, I can assure you that what might have 
happened in respect of other environments is not what we expect will 
happen to us. We refused and will continue to refuse any aid given to us
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with strings otherwise we become a neo-colonialist state and Zimbabwe 
hasn’t the desire to be either a colony or a neo-colony.11
Yet at 1991, Zimbabwe not only accepted IMF/WB funding, with all its 
attendant strings, but also permitted the two multi-lateral financial 
organisations to dictate its economic policies which were leading the 
country towards neo-colonialism.11 The forces that led to this situation 
need to be investigated.
This study seeks to understand the forces that compelled Zimbabwe to 
turn to the IMF and WB by analysing the major trends in Zimbabwe’s 
political economy in the first ten years of independence. It argues that the 
Zimbabwean Government achieved remarkable successes in the provision 
of services to the majority of the Zimbabwean people and did improve 
their quality of life. The reform efforts were, however, undermined by the 
failure of the country’s economy to grow at rates high enough to sustain 
the Governm ent’s reform agenda. The econom y's disappointing 
performance was partly the result of the government’s policy blunders 
and also partly because of several geo-poTitical and economic factors 
beyond the government’s control.
It is contended here that, while economic restructuring was clearly 
necessary at 1991, the Government’s decision to implement the IMF/WB 
variety of reform was unfortunate, in the light of the negative impact the 
reform programme had on the majority of the Zimbabwean people. More 
significantly, IMF/WB reforms were also likely to foist on the Zimbabwean 
people and economy the very neo-colonial dependency that the years of 
struggle against colonialism had sought to end. By analysing the character 
of the IMF/WB reform package and its impact in the first five years of its 
operation, the study tries to document the deleterious impact of the IMF/ 
WB reform programme between 1991 and 1995.
The study is structured as follows: Chapter 1 analyses the IMF/WB 
economic structural adjustment programmes and their implications for 
developing countries. It argues that the multi-lateral reform prescriptions 
are both ineffective and deleterious to the peoples and economies of the 
borrowing countries of the developing world. Chapter 2 and 3 examine the 
problems inherited by the independence government at 1980 and the 
performance of the Zimbabwean economy throughout the first decade of 
independence, respectively, to help explain why it became necessary for 
the country to introduce the economic reform programme at 1991.
Chapter 4 analyses the Government’s education and health policies in 
order to demonstrate that, despite the many constraints and problems 
confronting the Zimbabwean governm ent in the first decade of 
independence, impressive strides were made in the provision of social 
services to the Zimbabwean majority and that the people’s quality of life
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improved as a result. Chapter 5 demonstrates the impact of the economic 
structural adjustment programme on the Zimbabwean people with special 
emphasis on education and health. It argues that the programme had 
disastrous effects on the majority of the Zimbabwean people’s access to 
health and education.
Finally, the Conclusion summarises the findings of the study. It is hoped 
that the study will contribute to an understanding of the forces that shaped 
the tra jectory of Zim babwe’s experience in the first 15 years of 
independence as well as contribute to the ongoing debate about the role 
and impact of the IMF and WB in the developing countries.
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